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ABSTRACT
We present evidence on whether and how a household’s behavior is influenced by the presence and
characteristics of its extended family. Using household panel data from the Progresa program in rural
Mexico, we exploit information on the paternal and maternal surnames of heads and spouses in conjunction
with the Spanish naming convention to identify the inter and intra generational family links of each
household to others in the same village. We then exploit the randomized research design of the Progresa
evaluation data to identify whether the treatment effects of Progresa transfers on secondary school
enrolment vary according to the presence and characteristics of extended family. We find that Progresa
only raises secondary enrolment among households that are embedded in a family network. Eligible
but isolated households do not respond. The mechanism through which the extended family influences
household schooling choices is the redistribution of resources within the family network from eligibles
that receive de facto unconditional cash transfers from Progresa, towards eligibles on the margin of
enrolling their children into secondary school.
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1 Introduction
Economists usually focus on the nuclear family as the unit of analysis from which to study
household behavior. Indeed, standard models of household decision making, such as the unitary
model [Becker 1981], bargaining models [Manser and Brown 1980, McElroy and Horney 1981],
and collective choice models [Chiappori 1988] all emphasize the preferences and resources of
household members in shaping outcomes. Moreover, it is typically not possible to empirically
identify the precise familial ties between households in survey data.
However, every household is actually embedded within an extended family network. If
extended families shape the objectives and constraints relevant for households within them,
then neglecting the role of this network leads to an incomplete understanding of household
behaviors. The extended family may be especially relevant for household behavior in economic
environments characterized by missing markets, correlated shocks, informal institutions of con-
tract enforcement, and large scale policy interventions that affect many households in the local
economy.
All these features apply to the empirical context of this paper, which uses household panel
data from the Progresa social assistance program in rural Mexico. Progresa provides cash
transfers to households conditional on their childrens’ school attendance. In this paper we first
exploit information on the paternal and maternal surnames of heads and spouses in conjunction
with the Spanish naming convention in Mexico to identify the inter and intra generational
family links of each household to others in the village. We then exploit the randomized design
of the Progresa evaluation data to identify whether the treatment effects of Progresa transfers
on school enrolment vary according to the presence and characteristics of extended family
members.
Two key intuitions underlie our analysis. First, Progresa exogenously shifts the resources
available to individual households and to their family network as a whole. Second, families are
able to enforce implicit contracts of resource sharing. Hence Progresa can induce differential
responses between connected households — namely those embedded within family networks,
and those that are socially isolated in the sense that none of their extended family live in close
proximity and are not therefore subject to the change in resources that Progresa provides.1
While undoubtedly other households outside the extended family network also influence
behavior, there are good reasons to focus on family networks, rather than friendship networks
say, as being the core group within which resources are shared. First, evolutionary biology
suggests preferences are defined over the family dynasty, as is commonly modelled within an
1Our analysis relates to the literature on risk pooling arrangements across households. While such ex post risk
pooling mechanisms have been documented in developing country settings, formal tests of the Pareto efficient
allocation of risk being achieved at the village level are typically rejected [Townsend 1994, Ligon 1998, Dercon
and Krishnan 2000]. There is stronger evidence of risk pooling within ethnic groups [Deaton 1992, Udry 1994],
sub-castes [Munshi and Rosenzweig 2005], and family and friends [Rosenzweig 1988, Fafchamps and Lund 2003,
La Ferrara 2003, Cox and Fafchamps 2007].
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overlapping generations framework. Moreover there are specific inter-generational investments —
such as those into children’s education — that have no counterpart in friendship ties, and provide
long run incentives for family members to reciprocate in resource sharing arrangements. Finally,
the transactions costs of sharing resources with non-family members may be higher because it
is both more costly to observe outcomes outside the family network, and fewer mechanisms
exist by which to punish non-family members that renege on such arrangements [La Ferrara
2003].2
We exploit three key data features. First, we combine information on the paternal and
maternal surnames of household heads and their spouses, with the Spanish naming convention
to build two types of extended family link within the same village — (i) inter-generational links,
such as those from the head and spouse to their parents, and to their adult sons and daughters;
(ii) intra-generational links, such as those from the head and spouse to their brothers and sis-
ters. Combined with information from household rosters that identify extended family members
that co-reside in the household, this provides an almost complete mapping of extended family
structures across 506 villages, covering around 22,000 households and over 130,000 individu-
als. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time such a large scale mapping has been
conducted.
Second, we exploit the multiple components of Progresa, each of which provides cash trans-
fers conditional on a different household behavior. One component provides cash transfers
conditional on the attendance of children in primary and secondary school. However, as pre-
program primary school enrolment rates are above 90%, transfers provided for this purpose
represent a de facto unconditional cash transfer for households with primary school aged chil-
dren. In contrast pre-program secondary enrolment rates are 65% so that for many households
cash transfers will be obtained only if a change in behavior is induced. This is important be-
cause the value of transfers only corresponds to between one half to two thirds of the full time
child wage in the survey villages [Schultz 2004], and so do not fully compensate for foregone
earnings of secondary school aged children employed full time in the labor market.
Hence if households are credit constrained, Progresa’s effect on secondary enrolment may be
a function of the presence of primary school aged children, who receive de facto unconditional
transfers. In particular, households can use these transfers to supplement those specifically con-
ditioned on secondary school enrolment, thus fully offsetting the opportunity costs of enrolling
children into full time secondary school. This channel affects both connected and isolated house-
holds. In addition, if families share resources, and in particular they share the unconditional
transfers obtained from the primary school component of Progresa, the response of connected
households will also depend on the demographic composition of eligible households within their
2We therefore also contribute to the literature on the effects of extended family on household behavior, such
as for consumption [Altonji et al 1992]; inter-generational transfers [Cox and Jakubson 1995, Altonji et al 1997,
La Ferrara 2003, Behrman and Rosenzweig 2006]; childrens’ education choices [Loury 2006]; and non-resident
parental investments into children [Weiss and Willis 1985].
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family network. This drives a wedge between the program responses of connected and isolated
households in terms of secondary enrolment.
Third, we exploit the randomized research design used to evaluate Progresa. Of the 506
sampled villages, 320 were randomly assigned to be a treatment group, namely villages where
Progresa would be implemented, and 186 villages were controls. Data was collected on a panel
of around 22,000 households every six months over the pre and post-program periods. In
each village the baseline survey provides a complete census of all eligible and all non-eligible
households. Under standard assumptions this research design identifies the average treatment
effect of Progresa from a comparison of eligibles in treatment and control villages. The core
of our analysis identifies whether this treatment effect varies across connected and isolated
households.
Our main descriptive findings are as follows. First, 20% of couple headed households are
isolated in the sense that none of their extended family reside within the village, while 80% are
embedded within an extended family network. As a point of comparison, we note that 15% of
households are single headed. Second, there are no significant pre-program differences between
isolated and connected households in terms of their primary and secondary enrolment rates,
and overall poverty levels. Third, among connected households, the extended family of the
head is more likely to reside in the same village than the extended family of his spouse, and
this relates to higher levels of female migration at the time of marriage.3
Our main empirical findings are as follows. First, despite baseline enrolment rates being
similar in connected and isolated households, only connected households respond to the program
in terms of secondary school enrolment. The average treatment effect of Progresa on them is
significantly different from zero at around 9%. In contrast, eligible but isolated households do
not respond — their treatment effect varies between -.2% and .9% and is never significantly
different from zero.4
Our second set of results provides direct evidence on the interplay between the design
features of Progresa, whether a household is connected or isolated, and its response to the
program. In particular, we find that the marginal response of connected households in terms of
secondary enrolment depends on the demographic composition of their own household, and the
demographic composition of eligible households within their extended family. The particular
pattern of responses we document, that are a function of primary school aged children both
in the household and the eligible portion of the extended family network as a whole, point to
resources being redistributed within family networks towards households that are on the margin
of enrolling children into secondary school. These are those households that themselves receive
effectively unconditional Progresa transfers for the primary school enrolment of their children.
3This is similar to the findings of Rosenzweig and Stark [1989] who examine marital arrangements in rural
India.
4We build on earlier findings on the effects of Progresa on enrolment [Schultz 2004, Attanasio et al 2005,
Todd and Wolpin 2006]. This literature has not emphasized the influence of extended families on schooling
choices.
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Finally, we complement our main results by considering which specific family members
share resources and why. Among sibling links, the household’s response to Progresa in terms
of secondary school enrolment is sensitive to the eligibility status of their siblings, and in
particular, whether eligible siblings obtain unconditional transfers from having primary school
aged children. Among parent-adult child links, parental households are again sensitive to the
eligibility status of their adult children and the presence of younger children in their households.
These results together, on the influence of specific family links, consistently point to re-
sources being redistributed within the network from eligibles that receive largely unconditional
transfers for the primary school enrolment of their children, towards eligibles that are on the
margin of enrolling children into secondary school. The pattern of results also helps rule out
other mechanisms behind why family networks matter in this setting, such as information shar-
ing or providing access to communal land. This is because if families mattered through these
other channels, we would not expect household responses to Progresa in terms of secondary
school enrolment to depend on the extent to which other households in the family network
were eligible, or the extent to which these eligible households received transfers specific to their
primary school aged children.
Although our analysis exploits the particular design features of Progresa, the results have far
wider implications. The descriptive analysis presents new evidence on the nature of extended
family structures. This can serve as a foundation for future work on understanding behavior
in the markets for marriage, and insurance, for example. The econometric evidence highlights
how the design of welfare programs in developing countries cannot be done in isolation from an
understanding of behavior within extended family networks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Progresa program and data.
Section 3 discusses how we construct family links and provides descriptive evidence on them.
Section 4 presents the empirical method and supportive evidence on the underlying identifying
assumptions. Section 5 presents our baseline results on whether and why being connected
influences program responses. Section 6 presents evidence on how specific family links shape
schooling decisions. Section 7 concludes with a discussion of the broader implications of our
analysis. Additional results and robustness checks are in the Appendix.
2 The Progresa Program and Evaluation Data
2.1 Transfers
Progresa is an ongoing publicly funded social assistance program in Mexico. It is designed
to alleviate poverty by fostering human capital accumulation through two channels — (i) the
provision of cash transfers to households conditional on children’s attendance in primary and
secondary school grades; (ii) the provision of cash transfers and nutritional supplements condi-
tional on attendance at local health facilities. This component of Progresa targets households
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with pregnant or lactating women, and with children aged less than five.5
Central to the analysis in this paper is that the extended family members of any given
household can be eligible for transfers even if they have no secondary school age children.
For example, households with primary aged children, very young children and those with no
children but a pregnant women in them, can be eligible for the primary school, health, and
nutritional components respectively. Hence if families share resources, the response to Progresa
of households with secondary school age children will be partly determined by the demographic
composition of all eligible family members, not just those that also have secondary school aged
children.
Transfers for school enrolment are paid bimonthly and conditional on the child attending
classes at least 85% of the previous 60 days. Transfers are larger for higher school grades,
and for girls within any given grade. The average monthly transfer to eligible households is
non-negligible, corresponding to 20% of the value of monthly consumption expenditures pre-
program [Skoufias 2005].6 However, the value of transfers only corresponds to between one half
to two thirds of the full time child wage in the survey villages [Schultz 2004]. Hence the most
credit constrained households should not be induced to change their schooling choices by such
transfers alone.
Although both the education and health components are conditioned on household behav-
ior, the extent to which households need to change behavior to obtain the transfers depends
on their pre-program choices. As documented in Section 4, pre-program primary enrolment
rates are above 90%. Hence transfers provided to enrol children into primary school effectively
represent a pure income effect on households. In contrast pre-program secondary enrolment
rates are closer to 65%. Hence given the value of transfers conditional on secondary enrolment
do not compensate for the loss of income earned by children in the labor market, the likelihood
the program increases secondary enrolment rates will depend partly on the demographic com-
position of children in the household. In addition, if families share resources, the response of
connected households will in general depend on the demographic composition of eligible house-
holds within their entire family network. This channel drives a wedge between the behavioral
responses of connected and isolated households to the program in terms of the secondary school
enrolment.
Of course, some portion of the transfers received for secondary school enrolment may also
be viewed as de facto unconditional cash transfers that can be redistributed within the family
5The program was initially offered to 140,544 households in 1997, expanding to more than 2.6 million recipient
households throughout rural Mexico by the end of 1999. This constitutes around 40% of all rural families and
one ninth of all families in Mexico. The total annual budget of the program in 1999 was equivalent to just under
20% of the federal poverty alleviation budget or .2% of GDP [Skoufias 2005]. The program was expanded to
urban areas in 2003 under the name of Oportunidades. We do not exploit this expansion into urban areas for
our analysis.
6By November 1999 the bimonthly transfer ranged from 160 pesos for third grade, to 530 (610) pesos for
boys (girls) in ninth grade. The total amount received bimonthly by a household cannot however exceed 1500
pesos.
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if a household has a fraction of its children of secondary school age enrolled when Progresa
is initiated. However, as discussed in Section 6, because the majority of households tend to
have either none or all of their children enrolled in secondary school, there are far fewer such
households than those that receive de facto unconditional cash transfers related to their primary
school aged children.
Finally, the health and nutrition components of the program require the periodic attendance
of mothers at local health clinics. Households are likely to view this component as somewhere
between the purely unconditional transfers obtained for primary schooling, and the conditional
transfers obtained for secondary schooling. Again it will be the case that the response in terms
of secondary school enrolment will in general be influenced by the presence of young children in
the household to whom this component is targeted, and for connected households, the presence
of young children in eligible households within the family network as a whole.7
2.2 Eligibility and The Evaluation Data
In 1997 households were classified as either being eligible (poor) or non-eligible (not poor) for
Progresa transfers according to a household poverty index. This index is a weighted average of
household income (excluding children), household size, durables, land and livestock, education,
and other physical characteristics of the dwelling. The index is designed to give relatively
greater weight to correlates of permanent income rather than current income.
Around half the households were classified as poor and therefore eligible for Progresa. House-
holds were informed that their eligibility status would not change at least until November 1999,
irrespective of any variation in household income. Moreover, the monetary value of transfers
that eligibles were entitled to was determined by the age and gender composition of the children
resident in the household at baseline. There are therefore no incentives for eligibles to foster
children from non-eligibles with the aim of obtaining more transfers. Finally, a distinguishing
feature of Progresa is that households were clearly informed about the program’s introduction
through village-wide assembly meetings. These meetings also ensured households agreed with
their designated eligibility status. Hence take-up rates for at least one component of the pro-
gram among eligibles are over 90% and we do not therefore distinguish between intent-to-treat
and treatment effects.8
7The required frequency of attendance varies depending on age — children younger than 4 months are required
to attend three check ups, those aged 4 to 24 months attend 8 check ups, those aged 2 to 4 attend every 4
months, those aged 5 to 16 attend every six months, pregnant women attend five check ups during their prenatal
period, lactating women attend two check ups, and adults are required to attend annual check ups [Skoufias
2005].
8A group of households — referred to as densificados — had their eligibility status reclassified from non-eligible
to eligible in October 1998. A non-random subset of them began receiving Progresa transfers in treatment
villages prior to November 1999. As no precise algorithm exists to determine which densificados received
transfers in treatment villages, no counterfactual set of households exists for them in control villages. As we can
define extended family links to and from these households, all the reported descriptive statistics on extended
families include links to and from densificados. We do not consider changes in enrolment among densificados in
our analysis.
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To evaluate Progresa, an experimental research design was implemented and household data
collected on a panel of around 22,000 households every six months in 506 villages between March
1998 and November 1999.9 Of the 506 villages, 320 were randomly assigned to the treatment
group, namely locations where Progresa would be later implemented in May 1998, and 186
villages were assigned to be control villages. The first two waves were collected pre-program
(October 1997, March 1998). Transfers were first distributed in May 1998, hence the remaining
waves (October 1998, May 1999, November 1999) correspond to the post-program period. To
understand whether household behavior is influenced by the characteristics of extended family
members of both the head and spouse, we focus attention on the 85% of households that are
couple headed throughout.10
3 Constructing Extended Family Links
3.1 Surnames and the Matching Algorithm
To identify both the intra-generational and the inter-generational family links between any two
households in the same village we exploit information on surnames provided in the third wave
of data, and in conjunction with the naming convention in Mexico.11
Mexicans use two surnames — the first is inherited from the father’s paternal lineage and
the second from the mother’s paternal lineage. For example, former Mexican president Vicente
Fox Quesada would be identified by his given name (Vicente), his father’s paternal name (Fox)
and his mother’s paternal name (Quesada). In the evaluation data, respondents were asked
to provide the — (i) given name; (ii) paternal surname; and, (iii) maternal surname, for each
household member. Hence couple headed households have four associated surnames — the
paternal and maternal surnames of the head, and the paternal and maternal surnames of his
wife.12
9Villages were selected on the basis of a marginality index constructed from information on the share of
illiterate adults in the village; share of dwellings without water, drainage systems, electricity, and with floors of
dirt; average number of occupants per room in village households; share of population working in the primary
sector; distance from other villages, and health and school infrastructures in the village.
10Control villages began receiving Progresa transfers in December 1999. In 1997, eligible households in control
villages were informed they would become part of the program at the end of 1999 conditional on them still being
eligible and the program continuing.
11Two concerns arise from the surnames data being measured in the first wave of post-program data. First,
households may endogenously respond to the program by changing household structures, in particular, by
artificially forming new households in order to increase the number of eligibles in the family. This concern is
ameliorated by the fact that the register of eligible households was drawn up at baseline, and only households
recorded to be eligible at that point were later entitled to receive transfers. Moreover, although there is an
increase in the number of households from the baseline to October 1998, this increase is proportionately the
same in both treatment and control villages. A second concern is that the program may affect the migration
of the household head or of his spouse. However, only .4% (.5%) of households in wave 3 (5) report having a
migrant head or spouse. Moreover the share of households with such migrants does not differ across treatment
and control villages.
12The precise wording of the question in Spanish is, “Dígame por favor el nombre completo con todo y apellidos
de todas las personas que viven en este hogar, empezando por (jefe del hogar) — (i) nombre; (ii) apellido paterno;
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Figure 1 illustrates the matching algorithm. To define each family link, we use information
on two of the four surnames. Consider household A at the root of the family tree. The head
of the household has paternal and maternal surnames F1 and f1 respectively. His wife has
paternal and maternal surnames F2 and f2 respectively.13
The children of the couple in household A will adopt the paternal surnames of their fa-
ther (F1) and mother (F2). Hence we define there to be a parent-son relationship between
households A and B if — (i) the paternal surname of the head in household B is the same
as the paternal surname of the head in household A (F1); and, (ii) the maternal surname
of the head in household B is the same as the paternal surname of the spouse in household
A (F2). Parent-daughter relationships can be similarly defined. Moreover, intra-generational
family ties between siblings can also be identified. For example, the heads of households B and
C are identified to be brothers if they share the same paternal and maternal surnames.
Figure 1 shows all households to be couple headed solely to ease the exposition. To deal
with the 15% of households that are single headed we use information on the gender of the head
to accurately define family links. Finally, we impose the following restrictions when defining
family links — (i) inter-generational links exist when the relevant individuals have at least 15
years age difference, and no more than 60 years age difference between mother and child; (ii)
intra-generational links exist when the individuals have at most 30 years age difference.
However, there are limits to which information on surnames can be used to construct family
ties. Consider links from household i to a single headed household j. As Figure 1 shows, the
fact that household j is single headed does not affect the construction of links from the head
and spouse of household i either to their children or to their siblings. However, links from the
head (spouse) of household i to the household of his (her) parents can only be identified if both
his (her) parents are alive and resident together. This is because this particular family link is
identified using information from household j on the paternal surnames of both the head and
spouse.14
We define family links within villages because Progresa is implemented at the village level.
Hence geographically proximate family members are those most relevant to understand house-
hold behavior if families share resources. Isolated households may well have extended family
(iii) apellido materno”. We cleaned the surnames data as follows — (i) we removed non-alphabetical characters,
replaced “Sin Apellido” (no surname) with missing values, and corrected some obvious typos based on intra-
household surname checks; (ii) we imputed a small number of missing female surnames from wave 2; (iii) we
verified surnames using the same information from wave 5, and verified the relationship to the household head
using wave 1 data. No information on surnames is available in the first wave of data. The head of household is
originally defined to be the main income earner. In a very small number of cases the head of a couple headed
household is reported to be a women. To keep clear the exposition, we redefine the head to be male in such
cases.
13Paternal (maternal) surnames are indicated in upper (lower) case. First names are not shown as they are
irrelevant for the matching algorithm. In Anglo Saxon countries, F1 corresponds to the family name and F2
corresponds to the spouse’s maiden name.
14However this is unlikely to be a major issue. For example we note that female widows aged above 40 are
37% more likely to live as a dependent within a household, rather than head their own household, relative to a
similar married woman. These single parents are then recorded in the household roster.
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elsewhere and share resources with them, but their family is unlikely to experience any resource
changes due to Progresa because the data covers a period when the program was still being
rolled out.
The Appendix provides more descriptive evidence on surnames in this setting, and dis-
cusses various forms of measurement error in the family links, some of which can be quantified.
However, it is important to note that sources of measurement error that imply households are
incorrectly labelled as connected when in fact they are isolated makes it less likely that any
behavioral differences are found between households defined to be connected and isolated. In
addition, the econometric analysis only exploits information on whether such family links exist
for a household, not the number of such links. We also show the robustness of our main results
to dropping households with potential measurement error in their surnames, and to limiting the
sample to smaller villages where spurious links between households are less likely to be defined.
3.2 The Number of Extended Family Links
Table 1 shows the number of family links each household has to others in the village. The
columns of the upper panel split family links into — (i) inter-generational links to parents and
adult children who head their own households; (ii) intra-generational links to siblings who head
their own households. We report each type of link from the head and spouse separately. The
lower panel reports the number of corresponding family links that co-reside inside the household
as measured from the household roster in wave 3. Using information on the relationship to the
household head, we decompose these links into those from the head and spouse. Each type
of link is reported separately for connected and isolated households. By definition, the upper
panel reports that isolated households have no links to family members within the same village.
On links to extended family, Table 1 shows parents are many times more likely to reside
outside rather than inside the household of their adult children. The number of parents present
is higher for the head than for his spouse, and this is true for parents inside and outside the
household. This is consistent with either the spouse migrating to the village, or women moving
in with their husband’s family within the same village. To shed more light on this we exploit
data on spouse’s marital history. Wives were asked about where they went to live after marriage
— 49.3% stated that they went to live with their in-laws after marriage, and only 6.5% report
living with their own parents. The key difference between spouses with and without parents
resident in the village is that 85% of spouses that have their parents present in the village
report remaining in the same village at the time of marriage. The figure for spouses that
have no parental links in the village is only 61%. Along other margins, women in connected
households with and without parents in the village are similar. For example, they do not differ
significantly in their ages at marriage, nor in the proportions that report their in-laws originally
proposing the marriage (56%).
The number of links to adult children are, by construction, identical for head and spouse.
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Given respondents’ ages, there are many more young children inside than adult children outside
the household. Sibling links are more likely to be outside the household, which is as expected
given respondents’ ages. Heads have more siblings links than their spouses, and this is again
true for links both inside and outside the household. Overall, the upper panel shows that the
average household has family ties to just over five other households in the same village, and
that the majority of these family links are those of male heads of household.15
A concern is that isolated households may simply be those in which all family members reside
under the same roof. The lower panel of Table 1 shows this is not true — the average household
has around seven members and this is not different between connected and isolated households.
Another explanation for why isolated households exist relates to geographic mobility. On this
issue we note that while isolated and connected households are equally likely to report being
resident in the same state of birth, unfortunately, the data does not contain information on how
long individuals have been resident in the same village. However, we note that among isolated
households, only 52% of spouses report living in same village as at the time of marriage, which
is lower than that for spouses in connected households as reported above.16
Finally, we note that connected and isolated households are as likely to report receiving
remittances from family members that have permanently migrated away in the five years prior
to baseline. Hence isolated households do have family located somewhere, and may share
resources with them.17 The key difference for our analysis is that their families are far less
likely to receive Progresa resources since they live in different villages, and the program is being
scaled up during the period of study. This drives a wedge between the program response of
isolated and connected households, even if all families share resources.
To provide external validity to the links, the Appendix presents similar information from the
Mexican Family Life Survey, that was collected in rural areas over a comparable time period.
3.3 Family Networks
Table 2 shows how the probability of having an extended family link of type-j varies by eligibility
across treatment and control villages. We first note that 20% of couple headed households are
isolated. The incidence of not having extended family members geographically proximate in
the same village is therefore at least as high as the incidence of single headedness, which affects
15In October 1998 the average age of heads (spouses) among couple headed households is 45.0 (40.5). The
total number of siblings of the head is on average 2.23, implying his parents have 3.23 children that reside within
the same village. In contrast, heads have on average 4.70 of their own children somewhere in the village. Again
this is as expected given that siblings are older than adult children and so will be more likely to have migrated.
16Munshi and Rosenzweig [2005] provide evidence from India that those who migrate away from their sub-
caste lose the services of that network, including mutual insurance arrangements. The model they develop and
test implies the wealthiest households are those with incentives to withdraw from such arrangements. However,
in general, the relationship between wealth and exit is theoretically ambiguous [Banerjee and Newman 1998].
17There is however no information on pre-program transfers from other family members outside the village,
including temporary migrants or family members in the place of birth if the household has itself migrated.
Hence it is not possible to make inferences about whether the transactions costs of across village transfers are
higher than within village transfers, due to asymmetric information say.
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15% of households. We also see that links from the head are significantly more likely to exist
than links from his spouse, and that intra-generational links are significantly more common
than inter-generational links. These patterns hold for eligibles and non-eligibles in treatment
and control villages. Reassuringly, in nearly all cases there are no significant differences in
the extended family links of eligibles and non-eligibles between treatment and control villages,
which as explained in Section 4, relates to an underlying identifying assumption for the empirical
analysis.18
Table 3 provides descriptive evidence on family network characteristics as a whole, by treat-
ment and control villages. There are 1379 (817) family networks in treatment (control) villages
covering 10559 (6471) households. In treatment villages, the first column shows that on av-
erage there are around 7.6 households in each family. The average village has around seven
family dynasties so each dynasty encompasses 16% of all village households. The third column
provides information on the diameter of the network — the largest distance between any two
households in the network. This is around 2.4, implying family networks are unlikely to span
more than three generations.
The remaining columns document how family networks vary. We consider characteristics
that relate specifically to design features of Progresa that we exploit empirically. Networks span
eligibility status — there are an almost equal number of eligibles and non-eligibles in the average
family. Hence there is considerable scope for Progresa transfers to be redistributed within the
family. Family networks also vary in the share of households within them that have primary
and secondary school aged children. Hence, as shown in the final column, the potential value
of transfers each household is eligible for and hence the amount of resources to be redistributed
within the family, varies considerably between networks. Finally, Table 3 also decomposes the
variation in each statistic into that arising between family networks across different villages,
and across family networks within the same village. There is typically more variation within
networks in the same village than across villages. This is important given that identification
arises from across village comparisons of households with a given set of family characteristics.
4 Empirical Method
4.1 Descriptive Evidence
The empirical analysis estimates the response of eligibles to Progresa in terms of secondary
enrolment rates, and explores whether these responses vary depending on the presence and
characteristics of extended family members. To begin with, we denote the secondary enrolment
rate of household h in village v in survey wave t as Yhvt. This is defined as the fraction of
children aged between 11 and 16 resident in the household that are enrolled in school on survey
18The one exception is the proportion of non-eligibles with links from the spouse to her brother being signif-
icantly higher in controls. Our later analysis however focuses on the influence of same gender siblings.
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day in wave t. The behavioral response we focus on is the change in secondary enrolment
within the same household over time, between November 1999 (wave 5) and October 1997
(wave 1), denoted ∆Yhvt. This corresponds to more than one academic year after Progresa is
implemented.19
The left hand panel in Table 4 provides descriptive evidence on the pre-program levels
of secondary school enrolment rates, and how they vary over time in treatment and control
villages by eligibility status. While enrolment rates among eligibles at baseline are similar
across treatment and control villages, by November 1999 eligibles in treatment villages have
6.9% higher enrolment rates than eligibles in control villages. This DD is positive and significant
for both boys and girls enrolment, and consistent with previous studies, the proportionate
increase is greater for girls.20
The central panel of Table 4 splits the sample between connected and isolated households.
This reveals that eligible isolated and connected households have similar baseline levels of
enrolment, implying that determinants of the levels of enrolment — such as credit constraints,
information on the costs and benefits of schooling, or demand for child labor in the home —
do not, on average, explain baseline differences in the schooling choices between isolated and
connected households. Hence isolated households are at least as well off — in terms of secondary
enrolment — as connected households, and should not therefore be viewed as more vulnerable.
This idea is reinforced by the fact that isolated and connected households do not differ in their
poverty index at baseline, a measure of permanent income, as shown in Figure A2.
Despite similarities at baseline, there are significant differences in the program response of
isolated and connected households. The DD in enrolment rates among eligible and connected
households is 8.3% and significantly different from zero, while the DD for isolated households is
close to zero. In short, the previously documented positive effects of Progresa on secondary en-
rolment are a combination of a large and significant effect on the 80% of connected households,
and a close to zero effect on the 20% of isolated households. In line with this, we note that
take-up rates for school related transfers — either secondary or primary — are consistently higher
among connected households. Immediately after the initiating of Progresa, connected house-
holds have take-up rates that are .8% higher, and this difference rises to 4.0% by November
1999.21
The last panel in Table 4 shows the baseline levels and changes over time in primary en-
19The enrolment rate is constructed from individual child observations that have complete information on
the child’s age, gender, and residence. Waves 1 and 5 are collected during the school year which runs from
September to July. This eases concerns that households mis-report enrolment status either because children
are on school vacation or have dropped out part way through the academic year. We later also use primary
enrolment rates for some of the analysis — these are analogously defined for 6 to 10 year olds.
20Recall that the program design is such that households have no incentives to foster children in order to
obtain greater transfers. Indeed, we note these changes in enrolment are driven by changes in the number of
children enrolled in school, and not by the number of children resident in the household.
21Among non-eligibles, neither connected nor isolated households in treated villages have any significant
changes in enrolment vis-à-vis analogous households in control villages (not shown).
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rolment rates for connected and isolated households. The baseline levels of primary enrolment
are very high to begin with, and neither types of eligible household increase their enrolment
rates relative to analogous households in control villages. This confirms that transfers from this
component of Progresa are obtained without inducing any changes in behavior, and therefore
essentially act as a pure income effect that can potentially be redistributed within the family
network.
4.2 Estimation
We define three dummy variables — (i) Dh = 1 if household h is eligible, and zero otherwise; (ii)
Pvt = 1 if Progresa is in place in village v in wave t, and zero otherwise, so Pvt = 0 (Pvt = 1)
in the pre (post) program waves in treatment villages, and Pvt = 0 in control villages for all t;
(iii) Ljh = 1 if household h has family link-j in the village, and zero otherwise. The existence
of family links is treated as being time invariant. Although in the long run we expect family
networks to endogenously adjust to the permanent presence of Progresa, our analysis treats
networks as fixed over the time period considered.22 Our baseline specification is the following
first differenced OLS regression where all differences correspond to those between November
1999 and October 1997,
∆Yhvt = α+ β1∆Pvt + β2 (∆Pvt × Ljh) + β3Ljh + λ
′
Xhv+∆uhvt. (4.1)
∆Yhvt is the change in secondary enrolment within the same household over time, and ∆uhvt
captures unobserved time varying household characteristics, and standard errors are clustered
by village. Time invariant household determinants of enrolment — such as household preferences
or ability — are differenced out in this specification. To capture any omitted time varying
factors that would differentially drive enrolment rates in treatment and control villages and be
correlated to family links Ljh, in (4.1) we control for a series of characteristics Xhv of the head,
spouse, household, and village. Moreover we allow there to be a direct impact of the family
link-j on secondary enrolment to allow for the effect of having family present in the village to
change over time, say because of changes in other public assistance programs.23
To see how this specification relates to our parameters of interest, consider the simplest
22In support of this, we reiterate that the share of households reporting a migrant head or spouse is only .4%
(.5%) in wave 3 (5), and that the share of households with such migrants does not differ across treatment and
control villages. In the Appendix we show our main results to be robust to redefining family networks on the
basis of additional information collected in May 1999.
23The controls in Xhv are the head and spouse’s ages, literacy status, whether (s)he speaks an indigenous
language, the household poverty index, whether the household owns any land, and household size at baseline.
At the village level we control for the number of households in the village to capture any scale effects, the share
of households that are eligible to capture any aggregate income effects, the marginality index for the village, and
the village level enrolment rate at baseline among eligible and non-eligibles. This may correlate to distances to
school facilities for example. Hence we do not exploit data from villages that have all eligible or all non-eligible
households so the TTEs and ITEs are identified from the same set of villages. As randomization into treatment
and control groups takes place within region, we control for regional fixed effects throughout.
14
case in which Ljh = 1 if the household has any extended family present and Ljh = 0 if the
household is isolated in that no members of its extended family live in the same village. If
(4.1) is then estimated only for eligibles (Dh = 1), β1 + β2 identifies the average treatment
effect of Progresa on eligibles in treated villages that are embedded within family networks
(Ljh = 1). We denote this parameter as TTE
1. This difference-in-difference (DD) in secondary
enrolment is estimated from a comparison of the average change in enrolment among eligibles
in treatment villages with extended family present, relative to eligibles in control villages who
also have family present.
Similarly, β
1
identifies the average response to the program among eligible but isolated
households (Ljh = 0), denoted TTE
0, from the DD in enrolment of isolated households in
treatment and control villages. If families share resources, there exists a wedge between the
behavioral responses of connected and isolated households to Progresa, so that TTE1 > TTE0.
If (4.1) is estimated only for non-eligibles (Dh = 0), β1 + β2 identifies the average indirect
treatment effect of Progresa on non-eligibles in treatment villages that are embedded within
extended family networks. We denote this parameter as ITE1. Finally, when (4.1) is estimated
for non-eligibles, β
1
identifies the average indirect treatment effect of the program among non-
eligible and isolated households, ITE0. These ITEs shed light on whether there exist within
village spillovers of Progresa on secondary school enrolment. Spillovers onto non-eligibles may
arise either because extended family networks span eligibles and non-eligibles and resource
transfers take place between all households in the network, or because of general equilibrium
effects of Progresa.
4.3 Identification
Equation (4.1) makes precise the assumptions required for the TTE and ITE parameters to
be identified. First we require the standard twin assumptions of no cross village spillovers and
random assignment of villages into treatment and control villages (Cov(∆Pvt,∆uh) = 0). In
support of the first identifying assumption, we note that villages were, in part, included in the
evaluation data because they were geographically remote. In terms of the second identifying
assumption, it is has been previously documented that village characteristics do not signifi-
cantly differ in treatment and control villages suggesting randomization worked [Schultz 2004,
Behrman et al 2005]. Moreover, the descriptive evidence in Table 2 suggests the eligibles and
non-eligibles are similar in terms of the existence of family links across treatment and control
villages.
Together these assumptions imply the change in enrolment for eligibles and non-eligibles in
the absence of treatment in treatment villages would have been, on average, identical to the
change in enrolment in the absence of the program in control villages. In other words, eligibles
(non-eligibles) in control villages provide a valid counterfactual for eligibles (non-eligibles) in
treatment villages.
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To then estimate whether the TTEs and ITEs vary with regards to extended family links
of type-j, namely to consistently estimate β
2
, requires an additional assumption that the pres-
ence of link type-j is uncorrelated with unobservables that drive the response to Progresa
(Cov(Ljh,∆uh) = 0). However a central concern is that β2 captures two effects — (i) the
response to the Progresa program differs according to whether a household is isolated or em-
bedded within a family network; (ii) connected and isolated households differ in characteristics
that drive responses to Progresa and are correlated to the presence of the extended family.
To isolate the impact of the extended family per se, we need to purge the estimates of
factors that both drive the presence of extended family and responses to Progresa. To do this
we proceed as follows. First, we estimate what are the correlates of extended family link of
type-j being present in the village or not, as detailed in the Appendix. These results, reported in
Table A3, highlight that the following life cycle and cohort characteristics are robust predictors
of whether extended family members reside in the same village or not — whether the head’s
(spouse’s) age is above or below the median among couple headed households, whether the
head (spouse) is literate, whether the household owns land, and whether household size at
baseline is above or below the median among couple headed households. Using this analysis to
guide our approach we then allow for a household’s response to Progresa to be heterogeneous
along each of these dimensions. Hence we estimate the following specification for eligibles and
non-eligibles,
∆Yhvt = α+ β1∆Pvt + β2 (∆Pvt × Ljh) + β3Ljh +λ
′
Xhv+
∑
i
γ
2iZi +
∑
i
γ
3i (∆Pvt × Zi) +∆uhvt,
(4.2)
where Zi refers to each life cycle and cohort related dimension along which we allow the re-
sponse to Progresa to be heterogenous, in addition to allowing for heterogeneous responses
with the presence of the extended family link type-j. We additionally allow Zi to include the
average village level enrolment rates among eligible and non-eligibles at baseline, to pick up
any differential trends in enrolment by eligibility status.24 Overall, we therefore shed light on
whether there exists a differential effect of being embedded within a family network or not,
over and above any heterogeneous effects of characteristics that predict the existence of family
links.
Finally, in support of the identifying assumption that Cov(Ljh,∆uh) = 0, we provide three
pieces of additional evidence. First, we estimated a propensity score for being connected, for
each household based on the variables in Xhv, regional fixed effects, and a full set of household
demographic characteristics. The distribution of the propensity score by extended family links,
reveals connected and isolated households to be, overall, balanced in household observables
(Figure A1). Second, connected and isolated households have similar baseline enrolment rates,
and similar levels and distributions of permanent income, as measured by the household poverty
24As the effects of Progresa are allowed to be heterogeneous along other dimensions Zi, the TTEs and ITEs
are evaluated at the mean value of each variable in Zi.
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index (Figure A2). Third, the distribution of potential transfers available to isolated and
connected households is very similar, again because the demographic characteristics of children
do not differ across these household types at baseline (Figure 2A).
Any remaining econometric concerns relate to time varying unobservables,∆uh, that — (i) are
correlated to the existence of extended family; (ii) cause heterogeneous responses to Progresa;
and, (iii) do not drive the baseline levels of enrolment to be different across connected and
isolated households. In the Appendix we present a series of robustness checks that allow program
responses to vary with more village level characteristics, we explore the robustness of the results
in alternative subsamples of villages, and address concerns over unobserved household level
characteristics such as economic shocks driving enrolment changes.25
5 Does The Presence of Extended Family Matter?
5.1 Baseline Results
To begin with, Column 1 of Table 5 benchmarks our estimates against the existing literature
by reporting standard TTE and ITE estimates of Progresa from specification (4.1), by pooling
eligibles and non-eligibles and interacting ∆Pvt, Ljh, and (∆Pvt × Ljh) with the dummy for
eligibility status, Dh. These are averaged across households irrespective of their extended
family structure. The TTE estimate implies eligibles have a 7.8% increase in their secondary
enrolment rate compared to eligibles in control villages, which is similar in magnitude to the
previously documented program effects [Schultz 2004]. The ITE estimate implies non-eligibles
in treatment and control villages have similar changes in their secondary enrolment. This
suggests that, on average, there are no significant spillover effects of Progresa on the secondary
enrolment of non-eligibles.
Column 2a estimates all four parameters of interest from a single regression. The result
confirms that the TTE of Progresa is actually comprised of a large and significant effect on
eligibles that have extended family members present in the village (TTE1 > 0), and a negligible
and non significant effect among isolated households (TTE0 = 0).
There is no evidence of any ITEs on average for either households in family networks or
isolated households. The fact that the ITE1 is close is to zero itself implies there are no within
family spillovers in secondary enrolment rates for these households. If recipient households
redistribute some fraction of their transfers to non-eligibles within the same family network,
then either — (i) the amount transferred is too small for the average ITE1 to be positive
and significant; or, (ii) recipient households do not themselves use such resources to increase
25A concern over the interpretation of the results stems from Progresa having a direct effect on fertility. If so
the opportunity cost of female time will change and this may in turn drive schooling responses. Todd and Wolpin
[2006] develop and test a dynamic structural model of schooling and fertility choices, and find that fertility rates
are insensitive to the value of Progresa transfers, a result confirmed using a reduced form approach [Schultz
2004].
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secondary enrolment, but rather use them to change behavior along other margins such as
consumption, say.26
At the foot of the table we report the triple differences, ∆TTE = TTE1 − TTE0, and
∆ITE = ITE1−ITE0. The former captures the differential effect of Progresa between eligible
connected and isolated households within treatment villages, and similarly, the latter captures
the differential effect of Progresa between non-eligible connected and isolated households within
treatment villages. Column 2a shows that connected eligibles experience a 8.4% increase in their
secondary enrolment rate relative to eligible but isolated households within treatment villages.
Moreover, the ∆ITE estimate implies non-eligibles with and without extended family present
have almost identical changes in enrolment from the baseline period. Given these results on
the ITEs, we now focus on the TTEs and return to discuss the ITEs in Section 7.27
Column 2b estimates (4.2) and allows responses to Progresa to vary along a number of
additional dimensions that are correlated with the presence of extended family (Table A3), and
also allows the response to Progresa to vary with the baseline village enrolment rates among
eligibles and non-eligibles. We find the previous pattern of coefficients is robust to the inclusion
of these interactions. Connected eligibles have a — (i) 9.2% increase in their enrolment rate
relative to connected eligibles in control villages; (ii) 8.6% increase in their enrolment rate
relative to isolated eligibles in treatment villages. The previous estimates do not appear to
merely pick up heterogenous responses along observable dimensions that are correlated with
the existence of extended family links.28
While we can never rule out with certainty that there exists some unobserved characteristic
that drives the results, the stability of the estimates across specifications (4.1) and (4.2) is
reassuring, and the requirements for such a variable to explain the data are stringent. In
particular the unobserved characteristic should — (i) be correlated to the presence of extended
family in the village; (ii) drive responses to Progresa; (iii) not drive the baseline levels of
enrolment to be different across connected and isolated households.
Estimating (4.2) allows us to benchmark the magnitude of the effect of being embedded in
26Two further points are of note. First, the estimated parameters of interest are very similar whether they
are estimated from separate regressions for connected and isolated households, or from a pooled regression.
This implies the marginal effects of the other controls do not differ between connected and isolated households.
Second, the coefficient on Ljh, β3, which recall is not used to estimate any of our parameters of interest, is not
significantly different from zero. This suggests the effect of having an extended family on the level of enrolment
in the absence of Progresa, is not changing over this time period.
27As ∆ITE corresponds to coefficient on the interaction term, Ljh.Dh, the results suggest there is no differ-
ential effect of having extended family by eligibility status. Reassuringly, this is in line with the presence of
extended family not proxying for some unobservable that varies with eligibility status and drives enrolment over
time.
28Two simple explanations of this result would be that — (i) isolated households have higher enrolment rates
to begin with and so have less scope to respond to the program; (ii) trends in enrolment rates among isolated
households are different to others households over this time period. Neither of these explanations is supported
by the data. Although isolated households do have slightly higher enrolment rates than households embedded
in family networks at baseline, these enrolment rates are overtaken by November 1999 by the other households.
Second, the pattern of coefficients on the ITEs rule out the explanation that isolated households are naturally
changing their enrolment rates over this time period.
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a family network vis-à-vis other observable characteristics. We find that — (i) the magnitude
of TTE1 is larger than the TTE of most other observable characteristics; (ii) there are few
observable dimensions along which household behavior is as heterogenous as with regards to
whether members of the extended family are present or not. For example, the TTE of the
household owning land is .082, the TTE of the household not owning land is .065. While both
these TTEs are significant at the 1% level, the difference between them is not significantly
different from zero.29
We next repeat the analysis for boy’s and girl’s secondary enrolment separately. Columns
3a and 3b estimate (4.2) and show that, first, connected eligibles significantly increase the
enrolment of boys and girls more than analogous households in control villages. Second, eligible
but isolated households do not respond to the program in terms of boys enrolment, although the
TTE0 estimate is imprecisely estimated. As a result, the ∆TTE shows that the null hypothesis
that within treated villages connected and isolated households have the same response cannot
be rejected. Third, eligible but isolated households do not respond to the program in terms of
girls enrolment, despite the monetary value of conditional cash transfers being higher for girls’
enrolment, and the baseline level of girls’s enrolment being lower.
Having established the importance of being embedded within a family network for a house-
holds response to Progresa, we now begin to unpack why this is the case. To begin with, a
necessary condition behind why connected and isolated households respond differentially to the
program, is that the level of transfers conditional on secondary enrolment is not sufficient to
compensate the average eligible household for the opportunity costs of child labor. To provide
some evidence on this we use cross sectional variation in adult wage rates in October 1998 to
identify villages with above and below the median level of adult wages.
The results show that in villages where wages are sufficiently high — (i) in terms of boys
secondary enrolment, neither connected nor isolated households respond to Progresa (Column
4a); (ii) in terms of girls secondary enrolment, it remains the case that only connected house-
holds respond to the program (Column 4b). If children are substitutes for adults in the local
labor market so that their wages are positively correlated with adult wages, and if boys are
more likely to be engaged in labor market activities relative to girls, then the results suggest
the magnitude of transfers is not large enough to induce many households to change their be-
havior and increase the school enrolment of boys. Moreover, for connected households, there
exist limits to the resources family networks can redistribute towards members with secondary
school aged children.30
29The TTEs of the head being above (below) the median age among all couple headed households is .090
(.062), the spouse being above (below) the median age is .070 (.082), the head being literate (illiterate) is .061
(.118), the spouse being literate (illiterate) is .061 (.099), and the household size at baseline being above (below)
the median of all couple headed households is .041 (.096). These TTEs are all significant at the 1% level. The
difference in TTEs are not significantly different from zero except along two margins — the head being literate
or not (∆TTE = .057 and is significant at the 10% level), and household size at baseline being above or below
the median (∆TTE = −.054 and is significant at the 5% level).
30Using wages as measured in October 1998 may be problematic if in villages where children withdraw from the
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A second important factor underlying why connected and isolated households may respond
differentially to the program is that extended families share resources. We therefore check
whether family wealth is correlated to secondary enrolment rates at baseline for connected
households. To do so, we regress the baseline enrollment rate against the set of controls de-
scribed above, and additionally control for the average poverty index — which is positively
related to family wealth — among households in the extended family. The result in Column
5 shows that wealthier households have significantly higher enrolment rates at baseline. The
coefficient implies that if there were to be a one standard deviation increase in the poverty
index of the average family member, the households secondary enrolment rate would rise by
2%, relative to a baseline enrolment of 65%.
In the Appendix we present a series of robustness checks on our main result that only
connected households respond to Progresa. The first series of checks relate to concerns over
the surnames information and matching algorithm. In particular we show the robustness of
the baseline results to — (i) potential measurement error in surnames; (ii) limiting the sample
to smaller villages where there is less likelihood of spurious family links being defined; (iii)
the fact that our matching algorithm may measure the intrinsic value of surnames rather than
having anything inherently to do with extended family links. The second series of checks
address — (i) the concern that there are unobserved village level characteristics that drive
both the presence of isolated households and their differential response to Progresa; (ii) the
concern that there may be unobserved time varying household characteristics that drive their
program responses such as whether they are subject to economic shocks post-program; (iii) the
underlying identifying assumption that there are no spillover effects from treatment to control
villages; (iv) the underlying assumption that extended family networks are not changing over
time.31
5.2 Understanding Why Families Matter
To understand why connected and isolated households respond differently, we exploit the design
feature of Progresa that transfers provided conditional on primary enrolment effectively act as
a pure income effect on households. This implies, first, households with and without primary
school aged children should respond differentially to Progresa in terms of secondary enrolment.
Second, if families share resources, then the differential response between connected and isolated
labor market as a result of the program, are those that experience the greatest adult wage increases. However,
October 1998 corresponds to only five months after the introduction of the program. Hence wages are unlikely to
have adjusted to such an extent so as to change the cross sectional ranking of villages by adult wages. Moreover
we note that the correlation over time in adult wages in the 212 villages in which wages are available both at
baseline and in October 1998, is .749.
31An additional concern is that if children can flexibly supply any amount of hours to the labor market, then
children may enrol in school 85% of their time — just sufficient to obtain Progresa transfers — and then devote
the remaining 15% of their time to continue earning in the labor market. This hypothesis is not supported by
the data. Attendance rates in November 1999 are over 95% for both boys and girls, suggesting indivisibilities
or fixed costs in supplying labor to the market.
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households depends on the presence of primary school aged children in eligible households within
the extended family.
On the first mechanism, we estimate how the average treatment effect varies with the value
of transfers received by the household, and the presence of primary school aged children in
the household. On the second mechanism, we estimate how the average treatment effect varies
with the average value of transfers received by eligibles in the extended family of connected
households, and the presence of primary school aged children in the family network. As transfers
are provided conditional on household behavior, the actual transfers received are endogenously
determined. We therefore proxy actual transfer receipts with the potential value of transfers
the household could have received, as measured in October 1998. This is determined by the
demographic characteristics of children in the household at baseline.
Figure 2A shows that the distribution of potential transfers available to isolated and con-
nected households is very similar, because the demographic characteristics of children in isolated
and connected households do not differ at baseline. Figure 2B plots the potential transfers each
eligible connected household with secondary school age children receives against the average
potential transfer eligible households in its family network are entitled to. The correlation
between them is only -.01, because, as documented in Table 3, there exists considerable vari-
ation in the demographic characteristics of children across households within the same family
network.
We then use the following specification to estimate how, for eligibles, the response to Pro-
gresa varies with the potential transfers received by household h itself (TOh ), and with the
average value of transfers received by eligibles among the extended family (TFh ),
∆Yhvt =
α + βO
1
(
∆Pvt × T
O
h
)
+ βF
1
(
∆Pvt × T
F
h
)
+ βO
2
TOh + β
F
2
TFh
+λ′Xhv+
∑
i
γ
2iZi +
∑
i
γ
3i (∆Pvt × Zi) + ∆uhvt,
(5.1)
where all other controls are as previously defined, and standard errors are clustered by village.
The parameter of interest is how the response to Progresa varies with the intensity of treatment,
E[∆Yhvt|∆Pvt = 1, T
O
h , T
F
h ,Xhv, Zi]−E[∆Yhvt|∆Pvt = 0, T
O
h , T
F
h ,Xhv, Zi] = β
O
1
TOh +β
F
1
TFh +
∑
i
γ
3iZi.
(5.2)
As potential transfers are defined for eligibles in both treatment and control villages, this
is identified from a comparison of eligibles in treatment villages with a given value of potential
transfers, relative to eligibles in control villages that have an identical value of potential trans-
fers. Both sets of households also have the same family characteristics (connected or isolated).
By controlling directly for the level of potential transfers the household and average family
member are eligible for in (5.1), we capture any direct effects the demographic composition of
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the household and its extended family have on changes in secondary enrolment.32
Table 6 presents the results. The upper (lower) panel shows the results for households
with (without) primary school aged children in them at baseline. This allows us to assess any
interplay between the own and family transfers and whether the household is on the margin of
enrolling children into secondary school because it receives unconditional transfers for primary
school aged children. Throughout we evaluate (5.2) at the mean values of TOh , T
F
h , and each
Zi.
Column 1 estimates the program response among isolated households. We see that the
TTE is not significantly different from zero for isolated households, irrespective of whether they
have any primary school aged children in them or not. Repeating the exercise for connected
households in Column 2 shows that, on average, there is a positive and significant TTE for
households both with and without primary school aged children.
The remaining Columns shed light on how these TTEs vary with the demographic com-
position of the eligible family network. We first note that baseline enrolment rates are not
significantly different between connected households embedded in family networks in which the
minority of their extended family is both eligible and have primary school aged children, and
those embedded in families where the majority of members are both eligible and have primary
school aged children. This is the case both for those connected households without primary
school aged children themselves, and those with primary school aged children. Hence it is
meaningful to compare the behavioral response of response to Progresa as the characteristics
of their extended family change across the remaining columns of Table 6.
Column 3 focuses on families in which the minority of members are both eligible and have
primary school aged children. In such networks, Progresa leads to a relatively small increase in
available resources per household. The upper panel shows that households with primary school
aged children in such families significantly respond to the program. In contrast, the lower panel
shows that connected households that receive no unconditional transfers themselves are not
significantly influenced by the flow of resources into their household, or into the households of
eligible family members.
Hence there exists a subset of connected households who do not respond to Progresa —
namely those that receive no unconditional transfers themselves, and are part of family networks
that potentially receive only a small cash injection from Progresa. This is consistent with
resource sharing within family networks if some part of the change in resources are redistributed
towards those with primary school children who are on the margin of being able to enrol their
children into secondary school.
A useful thought experiment is to ask what would have been a household’s response to the
program if it were the only household in its family network to obtain transfers? To answer
this, Column 3 reports (5.2) evaluated at T Fh = 0. The estimate implies if a household is the
32For example, families with a larger share of primary school aged children may be learning more quickly
about the net benefits of secondary education for their older children, other things equal.
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only member of its extended family to obtain transfers, it does not significantly respond to the
program in terms of secondary school enrolment. As shown in the upper panel, this is true
even for those households who have primary school aged children and are closer to being able
to fully offset the opportunity costs of secondary school enrolment. This pattern of behavior —
that connected households do not respond to the program if others in their network are non-
eligible — is also found throughout the next Section, where we consider how program responses
vary with the presence and eligibility status of particular extended family members.
Finally, Column 4 focuses on the case in which the majority of family members are both
eligible and have primary school aged children. In these networks, Progresa leads to a relatively
large increase in resources per household. In such families, connected households with and
without primary school aged children are both sensitive on the margin to the total inflow of
resources to the family network.
Taken together, the results help rule out other mechanisms behind why families matter. For
example one alternative hypothesis would be that isolated households are not aware of the pro-
gram, while connected households may simply share information rather than resources within
their family network. However villages in the evaluation sample are small — the average number
of households in each is 45. It is hard to conceive of a significant proportion of households
remaining unaware of such a large scale policy intervention.
A second alternative explanation would be that the presence of extended family is correlated
to membership of ejidos which grant access to communal land, an institution that can help
enforce interlinked labour-credit contracts. This is not supported by the evidence because
if families mattered through these other channels, we would not expect household responses
to Progresa in terms of secondary school enrolment to depend on the extent to which other
households in the family network were eligible, or the extent to which these eligible households
received transfers specific to their primary school aged children.33
6 Which Family Members Matter and Why?
We now exploit the full richness of the constructed data on extended family links to shed light
on which family members matter for connected households’ response, and why. To do so, we
estimate (4.1) for households with family link type-j and show how their response to Progresa
varies with two characteristics of the link — the eligibility status of the link, and the demographic
composition of children in linked households.34
33In fact less than 13% of households report their occupation as ‘ejidatar’ at baseline, and this does not differ
between connected and isolated households. This perhaps reflects that ejidos have been in decline since land
titled reforms were introduced in 1992.
34For example, to understand whether the program response of household h varies with the eligibility status
of the brother of the head of household, we define our link variable, Ljh, to be equal to one if the head of
household h has brothers present in the village and at least one brother is himself eligible for Progresa transfers,
and zero if brothers are present in the village but all are non-eligible.
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6.1 Intra-generational Family Links
Column 1a of Table 7 estimates how the treatment effects of Progresa vary with the presence and
eligibility status of the same gender siblings of the head and spouse of household h — namely the
brother of the head of household, and the sister of his spouse.35 Column 1a shows that eligible
households in treatment villages that have an eligible brother of the head present, namely the
uncle of the children in household h, increase secondary enrolment rates significantly more than
analogous eligible households with eligible brothers in control villages (TTE1 > 0). In contrast,
there is no program response among eligible households with non-eligible brothers (TTE0 = 0).
Column 1b shows a similar pattern of responses among households by the eligibility status of the
sister of the spouse, namely the aunt of the children in household h. The fact that households
respond only if both they and their sibling are eligible for Progresa transfers is consistent with
there being few resources to redistribute within the family when other members of the extended
family are not eligible for Progresa.
The next columns explore whether for a given eligibility status of the sibling, the demo-
graphic composition of children in the sibling’s household affects the response of household h
to the program. This pins down whether there is a redistribution of unconditionally received
transfers from households with primary school aged children to their eligible siblings. We there-
fore define the link variable, Ljh, to be equal to one if the head of household h has an eligible
brother that has secondary school aged children, and equal to zero if the head of household h
has eligible brothers that only have primary school aged children.
Column 2a shows households with eligible brothers of the head present significantly in-
crease secondary enrolment relative to analogous households in control villages. Importantly,
the magnitude of the response is more than twice as large if siblings receive largely uncondi-
tional transfers through only having primary school aged children. Column 2b shows a similar
pattern of results when we consider how the response of households varies with the demographic
composition of children in the eligible household of the sister of the spouse.
One concern is that households whose siblings have younger children may differ on unob-
servables to those whose siblings have older children, and such unobservables drive program
responses. This is addressed in Columns 3a and 3b that show, conditional on the sibling being
non-eligible, the demographic composition of the children of siblings does not influence the
response of household h. It is not therefore the case that households that have siblings with
young children respond differently to the program per se. Rather it is the interaction of those
siblings being eligible for Progresa, with siblings receiving unconditional transfers for the pri-
mary school enrolment of their children, that allows household h to itself respond to Progresa.
35We focus on same gender siblings because, first, these household pairs are likely to be at similar stages of
the life cycle and so more similar on observables than cross-gender sibling pairs still resident in the village. In
particular secondary and primary school aged children are likely to be observed in both households. Second,
as shown in Table 3, the proportion of households with same gender siblings is the same across treatment and
control villages by eligibility — the same is not true for cross-gender sibling pairs.
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This is consistent with within family resource transfers taking place from eligible households
with primary school aged children to the households of their eligible siblings with secondary
school aged children. Such receiving households are likely to be on the margin of enrolling their
children into secondary school.
Finally, the results also show the presence of siblings with secondary school aged children
only influences program responses if those siblings are themselves eligible for Progresa. This
evidence contradicts the hypotheses that siblings share any fixed costs of secondary school, or
that behavior is driven by conformity or peer effects within siblings based on secondary school
outcomes. This is because such mechanisms should operate independent of the eligibility status
of sibling links.
On the other hand, the result may reflect that some portion of the transfers received for
secondary school enrolment are also viewed as de facto unconditional cash transfers that can
be redistributed within the family network. This is to be expected given — (i) baseline sec-
ondary enrolment rates of around 65%; (ii) around 50% of households with secondary school
aged children at baseline sending all of their children to secondary school. Hence we note
that approximately 33% of eligible households with secondary school aged children receive de
facto unconditional cash transfers related to these children, in comparison to 90% for eligible
households with primary school aged children.
6.2 Inter-generational Family Links
We now explore how household behavior is shaped by the characteristics of those in the family
network that are inter-generationally linked. We first consider the links between the head and
spouse of household h to their adult sons or daughters that head their own household j in the
village. These individuals correspond to the adult siblings of the children actually resident in
household h. Given the age structure of these links, we consider how the program response of
household h in terms of secondary school enrolment rates varies with the eligibility status and
the presence of young children in household j. The presence of young children matters if the
resources available to be shared are those transfers received on a largely unconditional basis,
such as those for primary school enrolment, or the attendance of children aged under five to
local health clinics.
As with sibling links, Column 1a of Table 8 shows eligible households only respond to
Progresa if their adult son is also eligible (TTE1 > 0, TTE0 = 0). Column 1b confirms
this applies equally to adult daughters resident in the village. To pin down whether these
responses reflect within family resource transfers from adult children to their parents, we note
first that the adult son is himself unlikely to have secondary school aged children. We therefore
estimate how the treatment effects vary in household h with the demographic composition of
children in the eligible households of their adult sons and daughters. Given the age profile of
such households, we consider the influence of eligible adult child households that have primary
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school aged children versus those that have no primary school aged children and are thus eligible
either because of the presence of very young children or a pregnant wife.
Columns 2a and 2b show the response of households, in terms of secondary school enrol-
ment, increases conditional on their adult sons and daughters being eligible, and irrespective
of the demographic composition of children in their adult son and daughter’s households. This
suggests adult sons and daughters view both components — transfers conditional on the primary
school enrolment of their children and those conditional on their attendance to health clinics —
as pure income transfers that can be redistributed within the family network.
Finally, we consider inter-generational links from the head and spouse to their parents —
namely, the paternal and maternal grandparents of the children in household h. Such elderly
households can be eligible for a health component of the program where those aged over 60 are
required to attend a clinic once per year. The results in Columns 3a and 3b show the response
of households to the program are generally weaker in the presence of the paternal or maternal
grandparents of the children. Unlike the other family links considered, this is the case irrespec-
tive of the eligibility status of the household in which the paternal or maternal grandparents
reside. This may reflect the low monetary value of transfers such elderly households are eligible
for [Skoufias 2005].36
7 Discussion
We have presented evidence from the Progresa social assistance program on whether and how
household behavior is influenced by the presence and characteristics of its extended family. Our
central finding is that Progresa raises secondary enrolment only among eligible households that
are embedded in extended family networks. Eligible but isolated households do not respond.
Our results suggest a key channel through which the extended family influences household
schooling choices relates to the redistribution of resources among family members to enable
eligible family members to fully overcome the opportunity costs of enrolling their children into
secondary school.
There are a number of common themes running throughout our analysis that we now bring
to the fore. The first stems from the design feature of Progresa that transfers are provided
directly to women. If this increases females’ bargaining power, household behavior may be
differentially influenced by the characteristics of the extended family of the wife relative to that
of her husband. However, throughout the paper we find no evidence that the family links of the
spouse are more influential than are the family links of her husband. The mechanism through
which extended family affects household schooling behavior — resource sharing — is qualitatively
36The evaluation data contains limited information on pre-program transfers. We note that those households
defined to be of older generations are more likely to report receiving transfers at baseline. This is consistent
with evidence from the Mexican Family Life Survey that transfers tend to flow from younger generations to
older generations in the family network.
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the same for both the head and spouse’s family links.37
A second common theme is that there is little evidence of any indirect treatment effect of
Progresa, namely that secondary enrolment rates among non-eligibles in the family network do
not increase on average. This suggests either — (i) resources are not transferred from eligibles
to non-eligibles in the network; (ii) the amounts transferred are small; (iii) non-eligibles do not
themselves use these resources to increase secondary enrolment.38
To shed light on this, in a companion paper we develop and test a model of insurance in these
villages using the constructed data on extended family networks. Using information on con-
sumption expenditures and exploiting the Progresa intervention as an exogenous income shock,
we find evidence of positive and significant TTEs and ITEs in consumption for households em-
bedded in family networks, and no effect for isolated households. This is in line with connected
households sharing risk within the extended family, and not with unrelated villagers.39
The final theme running throughout our analysis has been the interplay between the design
of conditional cash transfer programs, the presence of extended family members, and household
responses to the program. There are three policy implications of our findings for the design of
such programs. First, if families share resources, how connected households respond to such
policies on any given margin, will generally depend on the eligibility status of others in their
network. The particular design features of Progresa also lead to the behavior of connected
households to depend on the demographic composition of others in the family network. More
generally, our findings highlight that ignoring the presence and characteristics of the extended
family can lead to an incomplete understanding of the forces driving the behavioral responses
of households to large scale policy interventions in developing country settings.
Second, in this setting the value of transfers conditional on secondary school enrolment is
not sufficiently high to offset any potential loss in children’s labor market earnings if they were
37This result does not however imply that female bargaining power or the distribution of resources within the
household is unaltered by Progresa [Attanasio and Lechene 2002].
38Note that we do not find robust evidence of an effect of the program on the school enrolment of the average
non-eligible. Spillover effects in schooling have been reported by Bobonis and Finan [2006] and Cattaneo and
Lalive [2006]. These alternative findings may stem from methodological differences. For example, Bobonis and
Finan [2006] and Cattaneo and Lalive [2006] match children over the waves of the data and consider changes
in each individual’s enrolment status. Cattaneo and Lalive [2006] focus on the effects of the program in its
first year up to October 1998 (wave 3), and consider the enrolment among primary school aged children and
those transiting from primary to secondary school. Bobonis and Finan [2006] consider changes in enrolment
of those children that have completed primary school at baseline, and find such spillover effects predominantly
among those in non-eligible households on the margin of being eligible. Taken together, these results suggest
there may be heterogeneous spillover effects on non-eligibles, and heterogeneous effects on the children within
non-eligibles. Whether extended families influence the nature of such spillovers remains a question for future
research.
39These results build on those of Angelucci and De Giorgi [2006] who find there to be indirect effects on the
consumption of non-eligibles in treatment villages. They present evidence that this occurs through the insurance
and credit markets — households indirectly benefit from their neighbors higher income by receiving more transfers,
by borrowing more when hit by a negative idiosyncratic shock, and by reducing their precautionary savings.
Angelucci and De Giorgi [2006] and Gertler et al [2006] provide evidence that local food prices do not change
significantly over time between treatment and control villages suggesting that any ITEs are not being driven
by general equilibrium effects of Progresa.
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to enrol into full time secondary education. Our results suggest that the resources spent on
Progresa could therefore be more efficiently targeted if the policy aim is to increase secondary
school enrolment. In particular, if the program’s entire budget were to be channelled into trans-
fers conditional on secondary school enrolment — with no component conditioned on primary
enrolment, and such that the value of transfers offset children’s labor market earnings — then
we would expect both isolated and connected households to increase their secondary enrolment
rates.40
Finally, our analysis has general implications for understanding the role of family networks in
developing economies. Using data from over 22,000 households in 506 villages in rural Mexico,
we have documented that 20% of couple headed households are isolated in that none of their
extended family members are geographically proximate in the same village. The incidence of
this type of isolatedness is therefore at least as high as the incidence of single headedness,
which affects 15% of households in our data. While there exists a large literature on the effects
of single headedness on household welfare, our data and results suggest the importance of
designing future surveys to identify isolated households in other settings, and more generally,
to establish the social ties between households in survey data. Such information can then be
used to understand the effects of isolation and being part of geographically proximate kinship
networks on household behavior and welfare. This forms the basis of a broad and challenging
research agenda.41
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Mean, standard error in parentheses clustered by village
Connected Isolated Connected Isolated Connected Isolated Connected Isolated Connected Isolated
From head of household to: .461 - - - .652 - 2.23 - 3.34 -
(.010) (.066) (.111) (.164)
From spouse of household to: .250 - - - .652 - 1.63 - 2.54 -
(.007) (.066) (.103) (.160)
Connected Isolated Connected Isolated Connected Isolated Connected Isolated Connected Isolated
From head of household to: .062 .079 3.23 3.10 .821 .787 .033 .052 4.15 4.02
(.003) (.006) (.027) (.043) (.015) (.021) (.002) (.007) (.035) (.056)
From spouse of household to: .018 .021 3.23 3.10 .821 .787 .013 .017 4.09 3.93
(.001) (.003) (.027) (.043) (.015) (.021) (.001) (.003) (.034) (.054)
Inside the Household
Parent Children Aged 0-16 Adult Children Siblings All
Table 1: The Number of Extended Family Links, by Type of Link
Couple Headed Households
Outside the Household and in the Village
Parent Children Aged 0-16 Adult Children Siblings All
Notes: The sample is restricted to couple headed households in the baseline survey. Standard errors are clustered by village. Of the 22553 households that can be tracked in the first and third waves of Progresa
84.2% report to be couple headed in October 1997 (wave 1). We define the head of the household to be the male among the couple. By construction, the number of family links to parental households is always two
conditional on such a family link existing. By construction, the number of children of the couple inside and outside the household are identical for the head and the spouse. Adult children are defined to be at least 17 ye
of age.
Table 2: Probability of an Extended Family Link
Couple Headed Households
Mean, standard errors in parentheses clustered by village
Any Family 
Link 
(Connected)
Any Family 
Link of the 
Head
Any Family 
Link of the 
Spouse
Head to Head 
(Brothers)
Head to 
Spouse
Spouse to 
Head
Spouse to 
Spouse (Sisters)
Parents 
to Son
Parents 
to 
Daughter
Son to 
Parent
Daughter to 
Parent
Eligible Households
     Treatment .817 .693 .550 .506 .351 .338 .306 .150 .077 .169 .108
(.011) (.012) (.014) (.013) (.015) (.014) (.013) (.009) (.006) (.008) (.007)
     Control .800 .682 .541 .503 .364 .348 .314 .149 .079 .163 .097
(.017) (.020) (.023) (.023) (.026) (.026) (.026) (.014) (.009) (.011) (.008)
     Difference .017 .012 .009 .003 -.013 -.010 -.008 .002 -.002 .006 .011
(.020) (.023) (.028) (.026) (.030) (.030) (.030) (.016) (.010) (.013) (.011)
Non-eligible Households
     Treatment .808 .712 .523 .532 .332 .258 .248 .198 .112 .142 .074
(.016) (.018) (.021) (.021) (.018) (.016) (.017) (.015) (.010) (.014) (.008)
     Control .802 .694 .562 .481 .353 .313 .272 .226 .112 .126 .089
(.019) (.022) (.024) (.026) (.028) (.022) (.022) (.021) (.016) (.014) (.010)
     Difference .006 .019 -.039 .051 -.021   -.055** -.024 -.028 -.000 .016 -.015
(.025) (.028) (.032) (.034) (.034) (.027) (.028) (.026) (.019) (.020) (.013)
Intra-generational Family Links Inter-generational Family Links
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Standard errors are clustered by village. The sample is restricted to couple headed households that can be tracked over the first and third Progresa waves
Means and differences are reported for those households that have secondary school age children (aged 11 to 16) in the baseline survey of October 1997. The standard errors on the differences are calculated from
running a corresponding OLS regression, which allows for the error terms to be clustered by village.
Table 3: Family Network Descriptives
Means, standard deviation between villages in parentheses, standard deviation within villages in brackets
Treatment Villages Size of Global Family Network
Network Size/Number of 
Households in Village Diameter
Share that are 
Eligible
Share With Primary School 
Aged Children at Baseline
Share With Secondary School 
Aged Children at Baseline
Average Value of Potential 
Transfers Households in Network 
are Eligible for (March 1998, pesos)
Mean 7.66 .169 2.42 .518 .480 .480 746
Standard deviation between villages (.249) (.153) (1.20) (.233) (.150) (.139) (181)
Standard deviation within villages [.153] [.153] [2.14] [.259] [.262] [.263] [281]
Control Villages Size of Global Family Network
Network Size/Number of 
Households in Village Diameter
Share that are 
Eligible
Share With Primary School 
Aged Children at Baseline
Share With Secondary School 
Aged Children at Baseline
Average Value of Potential 
Transfers Households in Network 
are Eligible for (March 1998, pesos)
Mean 7.92 .163 2.51 .525 .484 .491 756
Standard deviation between villages (.230) (.141) (1.14) (.249) (.145) (.139) (188)
Standard deviation within villages [.155] [.155] [2.07] [.229] [.252] [.258] [297]
Notes: The sample is restricted to households that can be tracked over the first and third Progresa waves. There is one observation per family network so that each network has the same weight irrespective of the number of households within it. There are 1379
family networks in treatment villages covering 10559 households. There are 817 family networks in control villages covering 6471 households. The size of the network is the number of households in the network. The diameter of the networks is the longest
distance between two households that exists in a network. We define two households that are directly connected to be of distance one to each other. Primary school aged children are defined to be those aged 6 to 10 and resident in the household. Secondary
school aged children are defined to be those aged 11 to 16 and resident in the household. The average value of potential transfers households in the network are eligible for, are calculated among eligible households only. The standard deviations between and
within villages take account of the fact that there are an unequal number of family networks in each village.
Table 4: Descriptive Evidence on Enrolment Rates
Couple Headed Households
Mean, standard errors in parentheses clustered by village
Control Treatment All Households Connected Isolated Connected Isolated Connected Isolated Connected Isolated
October 1997 October 1997 Difference in Difference October 1997 October 1997
Difference in 
Difference
Difference in 
Difference October 1997 October 1997
Difference in 
Difference
Difference in 
Difference
All children .651 .654    .069*** .653 .654    .083*** .001 .927 .890 .013 -.011
(.016) (.012) (.016) (.011) (.015) (.017) (.031) (.005) (.013) (.012) (.021)
Boys .681 .685   .043** .681 .698  .044* .040 .932 .887 .020 -.001
(.017) (.013) (.022) (.012) (.016) (.023) (.047) (.006) (.014) (.015) (.031)
Girls .603 .612    .102*** .608 .610    .131*** -.030 .925 .901 .005 -.015
(.018) (.014) (.022) (.012) (.019) (.024) (.044) (.007) (.012) (.015) (.026)
Secondary School Enrolment Rates  (children aged 11 to 16) Primary School Enrolment Rates (children aged 6 to 10)
Eligibles, by Village Type Eligibles, by Family Link Type Eligibles, by Family Link Type
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The sample is restricted to couple headed households that can be tracked over the first and third Progresa waves. A household's secondary school enrolment rate is defined to
be the fraction of children aged 11 to 16 resident in the household that are full-time enrolled in secondary school at the time of the survey. A household's primary school enrolment rate is defined to be the fraction of children aged 6 to 10
resident in the household that are full-time enrolled in primary school at the time of the survey. In the left hand panel, the difference in difference is defined to be the difference in enrolment rates between households in treatment and control
villages in November 1999, minus the corresponding difference at baseline in October 1997. In the centre and right hand panels, this difference in difference is reported for connected and isolated households separately. Standard errors on
the differences are derived from an OLS regression, estimated on eligible and non-eligibles separately, of school enrolment rates on a dummy equal to one for Progresa  villages and zero otherwise. Standard errors are clustered by village.
Table 5: Baseline Estimates
Dependent Variable (Columns 1-4b): Change in Household's Secondary School Enrolment Rate (November 1999 - October 1997)
Dependent Variable (Column 5): Household's Secondary School Enrolment Rate at Baseline (October 1997)
OLS regression estimates, standard errors are clustered by village
Boys Girls Boys Girls All Children
Standard Family Links Interactions Interactions Interactions
Secondary Enrolment 
Rate at Baseline 
(October 1997)
(1) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5)
TTE    .078***
(.016)
ITE -.015
(.026)
TTE [connected]    .093***    .092***   .055**    .126*** .040    .095***
(.017) (.018) (.025) (.026) (.028) (.029)
TTE [isolated] .009 .006 .041 -.035 .038 -.013
(.032) (.032) (.048) (.046) (.056) (.050)
ITE [connected] -.016 -.027 .008 -.035 .005 -.020
(.028) (.030) (.042) (.046) (.049) (.050)
ITE [isolated] -.007 -.012 .020 -.006 .056 .019
(.061) (.061) (.083) (.077) (.089) (.080)
   .018***
(.006)
ΔTTE   .084**   .086** .013    .161*** .002  .107*
(.035) (.036) (.052) (.052) (.061) (.057)
ΔITE -.009 -.015 -.012 -.029 -.052 -.039
(.065) (.065) (.093) (.085) (.102) (.091)
Observations 6227 6227 6227 3947 3760 2844 2765 5919
All Children
High Adult Wage Villages
Average poverty index of households in 
the extended family / 100
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The sample is restricted to couple headed households that can be tracked over the first and third Progresa waves. Standard errors are
clustered by village. A household's secondary school enrolment rate is defined to be the fraction of children aged 11 to 16 resident in the household that are full-time enrolled in school at the time of the
survey. In Columns 2a onwards the link variable is defined to be equal to one if household h has any family links in the village, and zero otherwise. All specifications also control for the following - the
husband's age, literacy, whether he speaks an indigenous language, the spouse's age, literacy, whether she speaks an indigenous language, the household poverty index, whether the household owns
any land, the number of individuals in the household at baseline, the number of households in the village, the share of households in the village that are eligible, the marginality index for the village,
regional fixed effects, and the village level enrolment rate at baseline among eligible and non-eligible households. In Columns 2b to 4b the effects of the following controls are also allowed to vary with
eligibility status, Progresa , and the interaction of the two - whether the head's (spouse's) age is above or below the median among couple headed households, whether the head (spouse) is literate,
whether the household owns land, whether the household size at baseline is above or below the median among couple headed households, and the village level enrolment rates at the baseline among
eligible and non-eligible households. The samples in Columns 4a and 4b are restricted to villages that have above the median level of adult wages as recorded in October 1998. In Column 5 the sample
is restricted to connected households that have at least one secondary school aged child at baseline (October 1997), the dependent variable is the household's secondary enrolment rate at baseline,
and the same set of controls as in Column 1 are included. The household poverty index increases as the household has higher permanent income.
Table 6: Extended Families, Transfers, and the Response to Progresa
Dependent Variable: Change in Household's Secondary School Enrolment Rate (November 1999 - October 1997)
OLS regression estimates, standard errors are clustered by village
Isolated Connected
Own Transfer Own and Family Transfer
Minority of Family is Eligible and 
Has Primary School Aged Children
Majority of Family is Eligible and 
Has Primary School Aged Children
Households With Primary School Aged Children (1) (2) (3) (4)
TTE [evaluated at mean of own transfer] -.010
(.043)
TTE [evaluated at mean of own + family transfer]    .093***    .133***   .076**
(.021) (.035) (.030)
     Evaluated at mean of own transfer, family transfer = 0 .045
(.030)
Observations 659 3180 1622 1558
Households With No Primary School Aged Children
TTE [evaluated at mean of own transfer] .077
(.086)
TTE [evaluated at mean of own + family transfer]    .119*** .053  .116*
(.044) (.079) (.067)
     Evaluated at mean of own transfer, family transfer = 0 .096
(.077)
Observations 194 814 457 357
Connected Households, Varying Characteristics                       
of the Local Family Network
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The sample is restricted to eligible couple headed households that can be tracked over the first and third Progresa waves. Standard errors are clustered by
village. A household's secondary school enrolment rate is defined to be the fraction of children aged 11 to 16 resident in the household that are full-time enrolled in school at the time of the survey. For the own transfer
effects, the value of potential transfers to the households is evaluated at the mean of the distribution of such transfers in October 1998 among all eligible couple headed households that have secondary school aged
children. In Column 2 onwards, the family refers to the local family network at degree one to the household. The value of potential transfers to the local family network that is eligible is evaluated at the mean of the
distribution of such transfers in October 1998 among the local family network (excluding the household itself) of all connected eligible couple headed households that have secondary school aged children. All
specifications also control for the following - the husband's age, years of schooling, literacy, whether he speaks an indigenous language, the spouse's age, years of schooling, literacy, whether she speaks an indigenous
language, the household poverty index, the number of individuals in the household at baseline, the number of households in the village, the share of households in the village that are eligible, the marginality index for the
village, regional fixed effects, and the village level enrolment rate at baseline among eligible and non-eligible households. In all columns the effects of the following controls are also allowed to vary with Progresa - whether
the head's (spouse's) age is above or below the median among couple headed households, whether the head (spouse) is literate, whether the household owns land, whether the household size at baseline is above or
below the median among couple headed households, and the village level enrolment rates at the baseline among eligible and non-eligible households.
Table 7: Schooling and Eligibility Status of Intra-generational Family Links
Dependent Variable: Change in Household's Secondary School Enrolment Rate (November 1999 - October 1997)
OLS regression estimates, standard errors are clustered by village
Inter-generational Family Link Type: Brothers Sisters Brothers Sisters Brothers Sisters
Relationship to secondary school age children in household h: Father to Uncle
Mother to 
Aunt
Father to 
Uncle
Mother to 
Aunt
Father to 
Uncle
Mother to 
Aunt
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
TTE [linked household is eligible]    .134***    .106***
(.038) (.040)
TTE [linked household is non-eligible] -.010 .061
(.046) (.058)
TTE [linked household is eligible and has secondary school age children]  .096*    .139***
(.052) (.053)
TTE [linked household is eligible and has only primary school age children]    .215***   .183**
(.075) (.085)
TTE [linked household is non-eligible and has secondary school age children] .008 .040
(.056) (.078)
TTE [linked household is non-eligible and has only primary school age children] .106 -.025
(.176) (.152)
Observations 1366 1064 631 524 369 302
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The sample is restricted to couple headed households that can be tracked over the first and third Progresa waves. Standard errors are
clustered by village. A household's secondary school enrolment rate is defined to be the fraction of children aged 11 to 16 resident in the household that are full-time enrolled in school at the time of the
survey. All specifications also control for the following - the husband's age, years of schooling, literacy, whether he speaks an indigenous language, the spouse's age, years of schooling, literacy,
whether she speaks an indigenous language, the household poverty index, the number of individuals in the household at baseline, the number of households in the village, the share of households in the
village that are eligible, the marginality index for the village, regional fixed effects, and the village level enrolment rate at baseline among eligible and non-eligible households.
Table 8: Eligibility Status of Inter-generational Family Links
Dependent Variable: Change in Household's Secondary School Enrolment Rate (November 1999 - October 1997)
OLS regression estimates, standard errors are clustered by village
Inter-generational Link Type: Parents to Son Parents to Daughter Parents to Son
Parents to 
Daughter Son to Parents
Daughter to 
Parents
Relationship to secondary school age children 
in household h:
Father to Adult 
Brother
Mother to Adult 
Sister
Father to Adult 
Brother
Mother to Adult 
Sister
Father to          
Paternal 
Grandparents
Mother to          
Maternal 
Grandparents
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
TTE [linked household is eligible]    .206***    .173*** .085  .102*
(.045) (.054) (.053) (.060)
TTE [linked household is non-eligible] .078 .088 .001  .077*
(.077) (.120) (.037) (.046)
  .148**   .171**
(.063) (.078)
   .269***   .196**
(.060) (.083)
Observations 965 499 690 384 1028 649
TTE [linked household is eligible and has 
primary school aged children]
TTE [linked household is eligible and has no 
primary school aged children]
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The sample is restricted to couple headed households that can be tracked over the first and third Progresa waves. Standard errors are clustered by village. A
household's secondary school enrolment rate is defined to be the fraction of children aged 11 to 16 resident in the household that are full-time enrolled in school at the time of the survey. All specifications also control for the
following - the husband's age, years of schooling, literacy, whether he speaks an indigenous language, the spouse's age, years of schooling, literacy, whether she speaks an indigenous language, the household poverty index,
the number of individuals in the household at baseline, the number of households in the village, the share of households in the village that are eligible, the marginality index for the village, regional fixed effects, and the village
level enrolment rate at baseline among eligible and non-eligible households.
Figure 1: Family Tree
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Notes: We use the convention that the head's surnames are written in standard (black) font, and those of his wife are written in (red) italics. Paternal surnames
are indicated in upper case (F1, F2 ) and maternal surnames are indicated in lower case (f1, f2 ). First names are not shown as they are not relevant for the
construction of extended family ties. Each household in the family tree is assumed to be couple headed purely to ease the exposition.
Figure 2A: Potential Transfers in Eligible Isolated and Connected Households
Figure 2B: Potential Transfers in Eligible Households and Their Family Network
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Notes: The samples for both figures are based on eligible couple headed households that can be tracked over the first and third Progresa waves. Figure 2A plots
the potential transfers each eligible connected household with secondary school aged children may receive, as recorded in October 1998, split for isolated and
connected households. Figure 2B plots the potential transfers each eligible connected household with secondary school aged children may receive against the
average potential transfer eligible households in its family network of degree 1, are entitled to, as recorded in October 1998. The correlation between these two
potential sources of income for connected households is -.01.
Fr
ac
tio
n
A
ve
ra
ge
 V
al
ue
 o
f T
ra
ns
fe
rs
 H
ou
se
ho
ld
s 
in
  F
am
ily
 N
et
w
or
k
ar
e 
El
ig
ib
le
 fo
r (
O
ct
ob
er
 1
99
8,
 p
es
os
)
